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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce BINet, a neural network architecture for real-time
multi-perspective anomaly detection in business process event logs. BINet is
designed to handle both the control flow and the data perspective of a business
process. Additionally, we propose a set of heuristics for setting the threshold
of an anomaly detection algorithm automatically. We demonstrate that BINet
can be used to detect anomalies in event logs not only on a case level but also
on event attribute level. Finally, we demonstrate that a simple set of rules can
be used to utilize the output of BINet for anomaly classification. We compare
BINet to eight other state-of-the-art anomaly detection algorithms and evaluate
their performance on an elaborate data corpus of 29 synthetic and 15 real-life
event logs. BINet outperforms all other methods both on the synthetic as well
as on the real-life datasets.
Keywords: Business Process Management, Anomaly Detection, Artificial
Process Intelligence, Deep Learning, Recurrent Neural Networks
1. Introduction
Anomaly detection is an important topic for today’s businesses because its ap-
plication areas are so manifold. Fraud detection, intrusion detection, and outlier
detection are only a few examples. However, anomaly detection can also be ap-
plied to business process executions, for example, to clean datasets for more
robust predictive analytics and robotic process automation (RPA). Especially
in RPA, anomaly detection is an integral part because the robotic agents must
recognize tasks they are unable to execute not to halt the process. Naturally,
businesses are interested in anomalies within their processes because these can
be indicators for inefficiencies, insufficiently trained employees, or even fraud-
ulent activities. Consequently, being able to detect such anomalies is of great
value, for they can have an enormous impact on the economic well-being of the
business.
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In today’s digital world, companies rely more and more on process-aware in-
formation systems (PAISs) to accelerate their processes. Within these systems,
anomaly detection should be an automatic task, and thus an utterly autonomous
anomaly detection system is desirable. Most anomaly detection algorithms still
rely on a threshold that distinguishes normal from anomalous behavior. Typi-
cally, this threshold has to be set by a user and then remains fixed during the
execution. To set the threshold adequately, the user requires a deep understand-
ing of the underlying process, which, in the ever more complex processes of the
future, is a challenging endeavor.
This paper is an extension of our previous work on BINet from 2018 [1].
Compared to the original publication, we have slightly simplified the architec-
ture of BINet and present three different versions of BINet, each with different
dependency modeling capabilities. Additionally, we elaborate on the threshold
heuristics proposed in [1] and introduce a novel set of heuristics not mentioned
in the original paper. We improved the dataset generation algorithm, which
now uses an extended likelihood graph to generate causally dependent activi-
ties and event attributes. Finally, we propose a simple rule-based classifier to
distinguish different anomaly classes, solely based on the outputs of BINet.
BINet (Business Intelligence Network), is a neural network architecture that
allows detecting anomalies on event attribute level. Often, the cause of an
anomaly is only represented by the value of a single attribute. For example, a
user has executed an activity without permission. This anomaly is only repre-
sented by the user attribute of precisely this event. Anomaly detection algo-
rithms must work on the lowest (attribute) level, to provide the most significant
benefit. BINet has been designed to process both the control flow perspective
(sequence of activities) and the data perspective (see. [2]).
Due to the nature of the architecture of BINet, it can be used for ex-post
analysis, but can also be deployed in a real-time setting to detect anomalies at
runtime. Being able to detect anomalies at runtime is crucial because other-
wise no countermeasures can be initiated in time. BINet can be trained during
the execution of the process and therefore can adapt to concept drift. If un-
seen attribute values occur during the training, the network can be altered and
retrained on the historical data to include the new attribute value in the fu-
ture. Dealing with concept drift is also important since most business processes
are flexible systems. BINet can detect point anomalies as well as contextual
anomalies (see [3]).
BINet works under the following assumptions.
1. No domain knowledge about the process
2. No clean dataset (i.e., the dataset contains anomalous examples)
3. No reference model
4. No labels (i.e., no knowledge about anomalies)
5. No manual threshold
In the context of business processes, an anomaly is defined as a deviation
from a defined behavior, i.e., the business process. An anomaly is an event
that does not typically occur as a consequence of preceding events; specifically,
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Figure 1: A simple paper submission process which is used as an example throughout the
paper
their order and the combination of attributes. Anomalies that are attributed
to the order of activities (e.g., two activities are executed in the wrong order)
are called control flow anomalies. Anomalies that are attributed to the event
attributes (e.g., a user has executed an activity without permission) are called
data anomalies.
We compare BINet to eight state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods and
evaluate on a comprehensive dataset of 29 synthetic logs and 15 real-life logs,
using artificial anomalies. This work contains five main contributions.
1. BINet neural network architecture
2. Automatic threshold heuristics
3. Generation algorithm for synthetic event logs
4. Comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art methods
5. Method to classify anomalies based on outputs of BINet
Throughout this paper, we use a simple paper submission process as the pri-
mary example to illustrate concepts, methods, and results. The process model
in Fig. 1 describes the creation of a scientific paper. Note that the process in-
cludes the peer review process, which is executed by a reviewer, whereas the
paper is conceptualized and compiled by an author. We return to this process
in Sec. 3 when describing the dataset generation.
2. Related Work
In the field of process mining [2], it is popular to use discovery algorithms to
mine a process model from an event log and then use conformance checking to
detect anomalous behavior [4, 5, 6]. However, the proposed methods do not
utilize the event attributes, and therefore cannot be used to detect anomalies
on attribute level.
A more recent publication proposes the use of likelihood graphs to analyze
business process behavior [7]. This method includes important characteristics
of the process itself by including the event attributes as part of an extended
likelihood graph. However, this method relies on a discrete order in which the
attributes are connected to the graph, which may introduce a bias towards
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certain attributes. Furthermore, the same activities are mapped to the same
node in the likelihood graph, thereby assigning a single probability distribution
to each activity. In other words, control flow dependencies cannot be modeled by
the likelihood graph, because the probability distribution of attributes following
an activity does not depend on the history of events.
The main drawback of this method is that it uses the initial log to build
the likelihood graph, and therefore no case of the original log is classified as
anomalous. This is related to the method the authors chose to determine a
threshold for the anomaly detection task. We address this caveat again in
Sec. 5. Nevertheless, the notion of the likelihood graph inspired the generation
method for synthetic event logs in Sec. 3.
A review of traditional anomaly detection methodology can be found in [8].
Here, the authors describe and compare many methods that have been pro-
posed over the last decades. Another elaborate summary of anomaly detection
in discrete sequences is given by Chandola et al. in [9]. The authors differen-
tiate between five different basic methods for novelty detection: probabilistic,
distance-based, reconstruction-based, domain-based, and information-theoretic
novelty detection.
Probabilistic approaches estimate the probability distribution of the normal
class and thus can detect anomalies as they come from a different distribution.
An important probabilistic technique is the sliding window approach [10]. In
window-based anomaly detection, an anomaly score is assigned to each window
in a sequence. Then the anomaly score of the sequence can be inferred by
aggregating the window anomaly scores. Recently, Wressnegger et al. used this
approach for intrusion detection and gave an elaborate evaluation in [11]. While
being inexpensive and easy to implement, sliding window approaches show a
robust performance in finding anomalies in sequential data, especially within
short regions [9].
Distance-based novelty detection does not require a clean dataset, yet it is
only partly applicable to process cases, as anomalous cases are usually very
similar to normal ones. A popular distance-based approach is the one-class
support vector machine (OC-SVM). Scho¨lkopf et al. [12] first used support vector
machines [13] for anomaly detection.
Reconstruction-based novelty detection (e.g., neural networks) is based on
the idea to train a model that can reconstruct normal behavior but fails to do
so with anomalous behavior. Therefore, the reconstruction error can be used to
detect anomalies [14]. This approach has successfully been used for the detection
of control flow anomalies [15] as well as data flow anomalies [16] in event logs
of PAISs.
Domain-based novelty detection requires domain knowledge, which violates
our assumption of no domain knowledge about the process. Information-theoretic
novelty detection defines anomalies as the examples that influence an informa-
tion measure (e.g., entropy) on the whole dataset the most. Iteratively remov-
ing the data with the highest impact yields a cleaned dataset and thus a set of
anomalies.
The core of BINet is a recurrent neural network, trained to predict the next
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event and its attributes. The architecture is influenced by the works of Ever-
mann [17, 18] and Tax [19], who utilized long short-term memory [20] (LSTM)
networks for next event prediction, demonstrating their utility. LSTMs have
been used for anomaly detection in different contexts like acoustic novelty de-
tection [21] and predictive maintenance [22]. These applications mainly focus
on the detection of anomalies in time series and not, like BINet, on multi-
perspective anomaly detection in discrete sequences of events.
The novelty of BINet lies in the tailored architecture for business processes,
including the control flow and data perspective, the scoring function to assign
anomaly scores, and the automatic threshold heuristic. It is a universally ap-
plicable method for anomaly detection both in the control flow and the data
perspective of business process event logs. Furthermore, BINet fulfills all the
requirements connected to the assumptions above. Lastly, BINet can handle
multiple event attributes and model causal dependencies between control flow
and data perspective, as well dependencies between event attributes. This com-
bination is, to the best of our knowledge, novel to the field.
3. Datasets
As a basis for the following sections, we first want to define the terms case,
event, log, and attribute. A log consists of cases, each of which consists of
events executed within a process. Each event is defined by an activity name
and its attributes, e.g., a user who executed the event. We use a nomenclature
adapted from [2].
Definition 1. Case, Event, Log, Attribute. Let C be the set of all cases, and
E be the set of all events. The event sequence of a case c ∈ C, denoted by cˆ, is
defined as cˆ ∈ E∗, where E∗ is the set of all sequences over E . An event log is
a set of cases L ⊆ C. Let A be a set of attributes and V be a set of attribute
values, where Va is the set of possible values for the attribute a ∈ A. Note that
|cˆ| is the number of events in case c, |L| is the number of cases in L, and |A| is
the number of event attributes.
3.1. Synthetic Dataset Generation
To evaluate our method, we generated synthetic event logs from random process
models of different complexities. We used PLG2 [23] to generate six random
process models. The complexity of the models varies in the number of activities,
breadth, and width. We also use a handmade procurement process model called
P2P as in [1]. For demonstrative purposes, we also include the Paper process
from Fig. 1 in the datasets since it features human readable activities.
We adopt the notion of the extended likelihood graph (cf. [7]) to generate
causally dependent event attributes. For each activity in the process from Fig. 1,
we create a group of possible users allowed to execute the activity. Additionally,
we assign different probabilities to each user. Figure 2 demonstrates the final
result.
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Figure 2: A likelihood graph with user attribute; 1.0 probabilities omitted for simplicity
Note that the Experiment activity appears twice in the likelihood graph.
This is to introduce a long-term control flow dependency. That is, Conduct
Study always eventually follows Develop Hypothesis, and never eventually follows
Develop Method. Note also that the user group, as well as the corresponding
probabilities, are different.
This method can easily be extended to generate more than one event at-
tribute. For simplicity, the visualization in Fig. 2 uses a table-like structure to
depict the activities and the possible users. In reality, this is implemented as a
directed graph, where each possible user is a direct follower of the activity, with
the probabilities being the edge weights. Hence, we can add more attributes by
adding additional successors to each user and so on. Hereby, causal dependen-
cies between event attributes can be modeled (e.g., Main Author only works
Mondays and Tuesdays).
We have described long-term control flow dependencies as well as data de-
pendencies. Data to control flow dependencies are also possible, as in activity
Research Related Work. Develop Method always directly follows Research Re-
lated Work if Student is the user.
Now, we can generate event logs by using a random-walk through the like-
lihood graph, complying with the transition probabilities, generating activities
and attributes along the way. We implemented the generation algorithm so that
all these dependencies can be controlled by parameters and the event attributes
are automatically generated. Please refer to the code repository1, and specifi-
cally the notebooks section, for a detailed description of the algorithm as well
as examples.
In addition to the synthetic logs, we also use the real-life event logs from the
Business Process Intelligence Challenge (BPIC): BPIC122, BPIC133, BPIC154,
and BPIC175. Furthermore, we use a set of 4 event logs (Anonymous) from
1https://github.com/tnolle/binet
2http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/doku.php?id=2012:challenge
3http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/doku.php?id=2013:challenge
4http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/doku.php?id=2015:challenge
5http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/doku.php?id=2017:challenge
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Figure 3: Anomalies applied to cases of the paper submission process
real-life procurement processes provided by a consulting company.
3.2. Artificial Anomalies
Like Bezerra [24] and Bo¨hmer [7], we apply artificial anomalies to the event logs,
altering 30 percent of all cases. Inspired by the anomaly types used in [24, 7]
(Skip, Insert, and Switch) we identified more elaborate anomalies that frequently
occur in real business processes. These anomalies are defined as follows.
1. Skip: A necessary sequence of up to 3 events has been skipped
2. Insert : Up to 3 random activities have been inserted
3. Rework : A sequence of up to 3 events has been executed a second time
4. Early : A sequence of up to 2 events has been executed too early, and
hence are skipped later in the case
5. Late: A sequence of up to 2 events has been executed too late, and hence
are skipped earlier in the case
6. Attribute: An incorrect attribute value has been set in up to 3 events
Notice that we do apply the artificial anomalies to the real-life event logs
as well, knowing that they likely already contain natural anomalies which are
not labeled. Thereby, we can measure the performance of the algorithms on the
real-life logs to demonstrate feasibility while using the synthetic logs to evaluate
accuracy.
As indicated in Fig. 3 we can gather a ground truth dataset by marking
the attributes with their respective anomaly types. Note that we introduce a
Shift anomaly type, which is used to indicate the place where an Early or Late
event used to be. Essentially this is equivalent to a Skip; however, we want to
differentiate these two cases. This becomes important later on.
Notice that we insert a random event in case of Insert, i.e., the activity name
does not come from the original process. This is to prevent a random insert from
resembling, say, Rework, which is possible when randomly choosing an activity
from the original process. Attribute values of inserted events are set in the same
fashion. When applying an Attribute anomaly, we randomly select an attribute
value from the likelihood graph that is not a direct successor of the last node.
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Name. #Logs #Activities #Cases #Events #Attr. #Attr. Values
Paper 1 27 5K 66K 1 13
P2P 4 27 5K 48K–53K 1–4 13–386
Small 4 41 5K 53K–57K 1–4 13–360
Medium 4 65 5K 39K–42K 1–4 13–398
Large 4 85 5K 61K–68K 1–4 13–398
Huge 4 109 5K 47K–53K 1–4 13–420
Gigantic 4 154–157 5K 38K–42K 1–4 13–409
Wide 4 68–69 5K 39K–42K 1–4 13–382
BPIC12 1 73 13K 290K 0 0
BPIC13 3 11–27 0.8K–7.5K 4K–81K 2–4 23–1.8K
BPIC15 5 422–486 0.8K–1.4K 46K–62K 2–3 23–481
BPIC17 2 17–53 31K–43K 284K–1.2M 1 289–299
Anonymous 4 19–37 968–17K 6.9K–82K 1 160–362
Table 1: Overview showing dataset information
So, we created datasets with ground truth data on attribute level. For the
anomaly detection task, these labels are mapped to either Normal or Anomaly,
thus creating a binary classification problem. The ground truth data can easily
be adapted to case level by the following rule: A case is anomalous if any of the
attributes in its events are anomalous.
We generated 4 likelihood graphs for each synthetic process model with dif-
ferent numbers of attributes, different transition probabilities, and dependen-
cies. Then, we sampled logs from these likelihood graphs, resulting in 28 syn-
thetic logs (29, including the Paper dataset). Together with BPIC12, BPIC13,
BPIC15, BPIC17, and Anonymous, the corpus consists of 44 event logs. We re-
fer to the datasets by their names as defined in Table 3.2, which gives a detailed
overview of the corpus.
4. Method
In this section, we describe the BINet architecture and how it is utilized for
anomaly detection.
4.1. Preprocessing
Due to the mathematical nature of neural networks, we must transform the
logs into a numerical representation. To accomplish this, we encode all nominal
attribute values by using an integer encoding. An integer encoding is a mapping
Ia : Va → N of all possible attribute values for an attribute a to a unique positive
integer. The integer encoding is applied to all attributes of the log, including
the activity name.
Now, event logs can be represented as third-order tensors. Each event e
is a first-order tensor e ∈ RA, with A = |A|, the first attribute always being
the activity name, representing the control flow perspective. Hence, an event
is defined by its activity name and the event attributes. Each case is then
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represented as a second-order tensor C ∈ RE×A, with E = maxc∈L |cˆ|, being
the maximum case length of all cases in the log L. To force all cases to have
the same size, we pad all shorter cases with event tensors only containing zeros,
which we call padding events (these are ignored by the neural network).
The log L can now be represented as a third-order tensor L ∈ RC×E×A, with
C = |L|, the number of cases in log L. Using matrix index notation, we can
now obtain the second attribute of the third event in the ninth case with L9,3,2.
We can also obtain all the second attributes of the third event by L:,3,2, using
“:” to denote the cross-section of tensor L along the case axis. Likewise, we
can obtain all the second attributes of case nine by L9,:,2. Thus, we can define
a preprocessor as follows:
Definition 2. Preprocessor Let C, E, and A be defined as above, then a pre-
processor is a mapping P : L → RC×E×A.
The preprocessor P encodes all attribute values and then transform the log
L into its tensor representation. In the following, we refer to the preprocessed
log L by F (features), with F = P(L).
4.2. BINet Architecture
BINet is based on a neural network architecture that is trained to predict the
attributes of the next event. To model the sequential nature of event log data,
the core of BINet is a recurrent neural network, using a Gated Recurrent Unit
(GRU) [25], an alternative to the popular long short-term memory (LSTM) [20].
BINet processes the distinct sequence of events for each case. For each event,
BINet has to predict the next event based on the history of events in the case.
Thus, BINet is a sequence-to-sequence recurrent neural network.
It is important to understand that for each prediction, BINet has a recol-
lection of not only the last event in the sequence but all of the events. The
internal state of the GRU units changes with each new event and resembles a
latent representation of the sequence of events up until that point. For each
new case, these internal states are reset.
Figure 4 shows the internal architecture of BINet. We propose three versions
of BINet (BINetv1, BINetv2, and BINetv3). These versions differ in their capa-
bility of modeling causal dependencies based on the inputs they receive. BINet
consists of dedicated encoder GRUs (light green) for each input attribute (light
blue) of the last event. These GRUs are responsible for creating a latent repre-
sentation of the complete history of a single attribute. Note that each attribute
is fed through an embedding layer to reduce the input dimension (see [26, 27]).
The counterpart to the encoder GRUs are the decoder GRUs (dark green)
which receive as input a concatenation of attribute representations. These GRUs
are responsible for combining the control flow and the data perspective, and
hence to create a latent representation of the complete history of events that
is meaningful to the respective next attribute prediction in the next layer. For
prediction, BINet uses a softmax output layer (pink) for each next attribute. A
9
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Figure 4: BINet architectures for a log with two event attributes, User and Day; the three
versions of BINet differ only in the inputs they receive
softmax layer outputs a probability distribution over all possible values of the
respective attribute.
In its simplest form, BINet predicts the next activity and all next attributes
solely based on past events. This architecture is called BINetv1 (black). How-
ever, there likely exist causal dependencies between the activity and the corre-
sponding attribute values for that activity.
To model this dependency, we propose a second architecture, BINetv2 (red),
which in addition to the input of BINetv1, gets access to the activity of the next
event. This is to condition the attribute decoders onto the actual next activity,
as opposed to inferring the next activity from the states of the encoders. Using
the BINetv2 architecture, we can now model control flow to data dependencies.
There also likely exist dependencies between attributes (i.e., certain users
only work certain days of the week). With BINetv1 or BINetv2, these depen-
dencies are not modeled because the attributes are treated as though they were
independent. To address this, the last architecture we propose is BINetv3 (or-
ange), which gets access to the complete next event. Hence, BINetv3 can model
data to data dependencies.
Note that the selective concatenation layer (dark grey) is special in the sense
that it does not allow information to flow from one of the next event inputs to the
respective next attribute decoder GRU. We must prevent this because otherwise,
BINetv3 can simply predict correctly by observing the attributes in the next
event. This problem does not arise with BINetv1 and BINetv2, because the
activity GRU has no direct connection to the next event, and the user and day
GRUs only have access to the next activity. Apart from the encoder-decoder
structure, BINetv2 is essentially equivalent to the original BINet architecture
from [1].
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We want to elaborate on the differences in the BINet versions by referring
back to the paper submission process from Fig. 2. Suppose the last activity
input to BINet is Research Related Work and the user was Main Author. The
activity output should now give a probability of approximately 60 percent to
Develop Hypothesis. In case of BINetv1, however, the user output does not
match the 80 percent for Main Author and the 20 percent for Author, because
the respective decoders also have to take into account the other 40 percent of not
going to Develop Hypothesis, and hence output a higher probability for Student.
BINetv2 does not suffer from this problem, because it knows for certain that
Develop Hypothesis is the next activity (because of the next activity input), and
thus can learn the probabilities appropriately.
To demonstrate the advantage of BINetv3, we have to imagine a third week-
day attribute as part of the extended likelihood graph. Suppose for a given
activity Main Author works only on Fridays, and Author works from Monday
until Thursday. BINetv3 can correctly predict that if the weekday is Friday,
the user must be Main Author, whereas BINetv2 is not. Likewise, BINetv3 can
infer that if the user is Main Author, the day must be Friday.
For BINetv1, activity, user, and day are entirely independent, for BINetv2,
user and day are dependent on the activity, and for BINetv3, user is dependent
on activity and day, whereas day is dependent on activity and user. Our imple-
mentation of BINet theoretically allows for any number of events and attributes.
4.3. Calculating Anomaly Scores
After the initial training phase, BINet can now be used for anomaly detection.
This is based on the assumption that BINet assigns a lower probability to an
anomalous attribute than a normal attribute.
The last step of the anomaly detection process is the scoring of the events.
Therefore, we use a scoring function in the last layer of the architecture. This
scoring function for an attribute a receives as input the output of the softmax
layer for a, that is, a probability distribution pa, and the actual value of the
attribute, v.
Using the example above (the last activity being Research Related Work and
the user being Main Author), the output of the activity softmax layer might
look as depicted in Fig. 5. The probability p for Develop Hypothesis is 0.55,
and the probability for Develop Method is 0.30. Note that BINet gives a high
probability for the two correct next activities with respect to the paper process.
We can now define the anomaly score for a possible attribute value v as the
sum of all probabilities p of the probability distribution tensor p greater than
the probability assigned to v, pv. The scoring function σ is therefore defined as
follows, with pi being i-th probability.
σ(p, pv) =
∑
pi>pv
pi
Figure 5 also shows the resulting anomaly scores, s, for each possible activity. In-
tuitively, an anomaly score of 0.55 indicates that the probability of an attribute
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Figure 5: Output of the activity softmax layer after reading activity Research Related Work
and user Main Author
value lies within the top 55 percent (plus a small margin) confidence interval of
BINet. Thus, we can set a threshold as indicated in Fig. 5 (τ = 0.8), to flag
all values as normal that lie within the first 80 percent of BINet’s confidence
interval.
The scoring function σ is applied to each softmax output of BINet, trans-
forming the probability distribution tensor into a scalar anomaly score. We can
now obtain the anomaly scores tensor S by applying BINet to the feature tensor
F,
S = (sijk) ∈ RC×E×A = BINet(F),
mapping an anomaly score to each attribute in each event in each case. The
anomaly score for attributes of padding events is always 0.
4.4. Training
BINet is trained without the scoring function. The GRU units are trained in
sequence to sequence fashion. With each event that is fed in, the network is
trained to predict the attributes of the next event. We train BINet with a GRU
size of 2E (two times the maximum case length), on mini batches of size 500 for
20 epochs using the Adam optimizer with the parameters stated in the original
paper [28]. Additionally, we use batch normalization [29] after each GRU to
counteract overfitting.
4.5. Detection
An anomaly detector only outputs anomaly scores. We need to define a function
that maps anomaly scores to a label l ∈ {0, 1}, 0 indicating normal and 1 indi-
cating anomalous, by applying a threshold τ . Whenever an anomaly score for
an attribute is greater than τ , this attribute is flagged as anomalous. Therefore,
we define a threshold function θ, with inputs S and τ ∈ R.
θ(S, τ) = Yijk =
{
1 if Sijk > τ
0 otherwise
12
τ τ τ
Figure 6: Example of how an anomaly detection visualization changes with different threshold
settings; the rightmost setting corresponds to how a user would likely set the slider manually
In the example from Fig. 5, setting τ = 0.8 results in Develop Hypothesis and
Develop Method being flagged as normal, whereas all other activities are flagged
as anomalous.
4.6. Threshold Heuristic
Most anomaly detection algorithms rely on the user setting a threshold manually
or define the threshold as a constant. To determine a threshold automatically,
we propose a new heuristic that mimics how a human would set a threshold
manually.
Let us consider the following example. A user is presented with a visual-
ization of an anomaly detection result, say, a simple case overview showing all
events and their attributes like depicted in Fig. 6. Anomalous attributes are
shown in red and normal attributes are shown in green. The user is asked to
set the threshold manually using a slider. Most people start with the slider ei-
ther set to the maximum (all attributes are normal, all green) or the minimum
(all attributes are anomalous, all red) and then move the slider while observing
the change of colors in the visualization. Intuitively, most users fix the slider
within a region where the number of shown anomalies is stable, that is, even
when moving the slider to the left and right, the visualization stays the same.
Furthermore, users likely prefer a threshold setting that shows significantly less
anomalous than normal attributes, which corresponds to a slider setting closer
to the maximum (the right side). In other words, a setting that produces less
false positives.
This behavior of a human setting the threshold can be modeled based on the
anomaly ratio r, which can be defined as follows, with N =
∑
c∈L |cˆ| denoting
the number of non-padding events and Y = θ(S, τ).
r(θ,S, τ) =
1
NA
C∑
i
E∑
j
A∑
k
Yijk
By dividing by N we calculate the average based only on non-padding events.
Figure 7 shows r for a run of BINetv1 on the Paper dataset. In addition to
r, the figure shows the values for Precision and Recall for the anomaly class.
Note that r is a discrete function that we sample for each reasonable threshold.
Reasonable candidate thresholds are the distinct anomaly scores encountered in
S; other values can be disregarded. The candidate thresholds T are indicated
by the minor ticks and the respective dotted grid lines in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: Thresholds as defined by the heuristics in relation to the anomaly ratio r and its
plateaus (blue intervals)
To define the heuristics in the following, we first have to define the first
and second order derivatives of the discrete function r. They can be retrieved
using the central difference approximation. Let τi ∈ T , then the derivatives are
approximated by
r′(θ,S, τi) ≈ r(θ,S, τi+1)− r(θ,S, τi)
τi+1 − τi ,
r′′(θ,S, τi) ≈ r(θ,S, τi−1)− 2 r(θ,S, τi) + r(θ,S, τi−1)
(τi−1 − τi)(τi − τi+1) .
To mimic the human intuition, we have to consider regions of r where the
slope is close to zero. These are regions where |r′(θ,S, τ)| < ε (we chose ε to be
two times the average slope of r), which we refer to as plateaus (blue regions in
Fig. 7). Based on these plateaus we can now define the lowest plateau heuristic
lp as follows. Let LP = 〈τ0, τ1, . . . , τn〉 be the sequence of candidate thresholds
that lie within the lowest plateau, then
lp← = τ0, lp↔ =
1
n
n∑
i=0
τi, lp→ = τn,
corresponding to the left-most (lp←), the right-most (lp→), and the mean-
centered (lp↔) threshold inside the lowest plateau.
In [1] we proposed the elbow heuristic to mimic the same behavior. The
definition of the elbow heuristics are given by
elbow↓ = arg max
τ∈T
r′′(θ,S, τ), elbow↑ = arg min
τ∈T
r′′(θ,S, τ).
So, elbow↓ is the threshold where the rate of change of r is maximized, whereas
elbow↑ is the minimum. With respect to r these thresholds are the points where
either a steep drop ends in a plateau (elbow↓) or a plateau ends in a steep drop
(elbow↑). Although elbow↓ and elbow↑ can indicate the beginning and the end
of a plateau, these are not necessarily the thresholds a human would naturally
pick.
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To compare our results to the best possible threshold, we define the best
heuristic by use of the F1 score metric. The best heuristic is defined as follows,
where L is the set of ground truth labels.
best = arg max
τ∈T
F1(L, θ(S, τ)).
It is important to understand that best can only be used if the labels are available
at runtime. However, in most cases, anomaly detection is an unsupervised
problem, and hence no labels are available.
It might be beneficial to apply different thresholds to different dimensions
of S. For example, it might be sensible to set a different threshold for the user
attribute than the activity because the inherent probability distribution can be
different. This is possible by using “:” to apply heuristics on cross-sections of S
by using index notation. Let h ∈ {lp←, lp↔, lp→, elbow↓, elbow↑, best} then we
can define the following threshold strategies
h = h(S),
h(a) = (τi) = h(S:,:,i),
h(e) = (τi) = h(S:,i,:),
h(ea) = (τij) = h(S:,i,j).
We only explicitly show the parameter S for clarity, other parameters are set
according to the definition of the chosen heuristic.
Thus, h(a) ∈ RA returns a tensor that holds one threshold for each attribute
in an event, whereas h(e) ∈ RE holds a threshold for each event position in a
case. Lastly, h(ea) ∈ RE×A combines the two ideas and gives a threshold for each
combination of event position and attribute. In other words, instead of applying
the threshold heuristic h once for all dimensions of S, we apply it multiple times
for different cross-sections of S, obtaining multiple different thresholds.
5. Evaluation
We evaluated BINet on all 44 event logs and compared it to eight state-of-the-art
methods. Two methods from [9]: a sliding window approach (t-STIDE+) [10];
and the one-class SVM (OC-SVM). Additionally, we compared BINet to two
approaches from [24]: the Naive algorithm and the Sampling algorithm. Fur-
thermore, we provide the results of the denoising autoencoder (DAE) approach
from [16]. Lastly, we compared BINet to the approach from [7] (Likelihood).
Naive and Likelihood set the threshold automatically, so we extended the ap-
proaches to support the use of external threshold heuristics. These extensions
are referred to by Naive+ and Likelihood+. For all non-deterministic meth-
ods (i.e., DAE, BINet, and Sampling), we executed five independent runs to
counteract the randomness.
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Figure 8: Average F1 score by method and strategy over all synthetic datasets, using best as
the heuristic
For the OC-SVM, we relied on the implementation of scikit-learn6 using an
RBF kernel of degree 3 and ν = 0.5. The Naive, Sampling, Likelihood, and
DAE methods were implemented as described in the original papers. Sampling,
Likelihood, Baseline, and the OC-SVM do not rely on a manual setting of the
threshold and were unaltered. t-STIDE+ is an implementation of the t-STIDE
method from [10], which we adapted to support the data perspective (see [16]).
Naive+ is an implementation of Naive that removes the fixed threshold of 0.02
and sets the threshold according to the heuristic. Likelihood+ implements the
first part of Likelihood (the generation of the extended likelihood graph from the
log) and replaces the threshold algorithm with the aforementioned heuristics.
In the last section, we described the intuition of setting separate thresholds
using different strategies (e.g., one threshold per attribute). To decide on the
best strategy, we evaluate the four strategies (h, h(e), h(a), and h(ea)) for all
synthetic datasets and all methods that support the heuristics, with h = best.
The results of the experiments in Fig. 8 indicate that, indeed, it is sensible to
set separate thresholds for individual attributes. Interestingly, we also find that
setting a single threshold yields similar results. Setting a threshold per event or
per event and attribute does perform significantly worse.
Next, we repeated the same experiment for all of the aforementioned heuris-
tics and using h(a) as the strategy. The results can be seen in Fig. 9. Intriguingly,
the lowest plateau heuristics perform best for all methods except the DAE. Fur-
thermore, it seems to work best to choose the mean-centered threshold within
the lowest plateau (lp↔).
Based on the results of the preliminary experiments, we set h = lp(a)↔ as the
heuristic for the following experiments for all methods apart from the DAE, for
which we set h = elbow
(a)
↑ . For Likelihood, Sampling, Naive, and OC-SVM we
use the internal threshold heuristics.
The overall results are shown in Fig. 10. Note that for the real-life datasets
we do not have complete information, and hence the F1 score is not a good
representation of the quality of the detection algorithms. However, because
we compare all methods on the same basis, the results are still meaningful.
Furthermore, we only know about the artificial anomalies inside the real-life
6http://scikit-learn.org
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Figure 9: Average F1 score by method and heuristic over all synthetic datasets, using h(a) as
the strategy
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Figure 10: Average Precision, Recall, and F1 by dataset type over all datasets; error bars
indicate variance over datasets with different numbers of attributes and multiple runs
datasets, and therefore we expect a high recall (of the artificial anomalies),
whereas we expect a low precision because the dataset likely contains natural
anomalies (which are not labeled).
This theory is confirmed by the results in Fig. 10. Note also that the recall
scores for both the synthetic and the real-life datasets are very similar, indicating
comparable performance (for artificial anomalies) on both dataset types.
Finally, we find that BINetv1 works best on the synthetic datasets, whereas
the field is mixed on the real-life datasets. However, all three BINet versions
perform better than the other methods. DAE performs significantly worse on
real-life data because it ran out of memory on some of the bigger datasets.
Therefore, DAE has been penalized defining precision and recall to be zero for
these runs.
Detailed results can be found in Tab. 5, which also gives results for case level
(i.e., only anomalous cases have to be detected, not the attributes). An inter-
esting observation is that t-STIDE+ performs best on BPIC12 when evaluating
on case level. This might be attributed to BPIC12 being a dataset without
event attributes (the only one in the corpus). On attribute level, Likelihood+ is
marginally better than BINet on BPIC13. For all other datasets, BINet shows
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Level Method Paper P2P Small Medium Large Huge Gigantic Wide BPIC12 BPIC13 BPIC15 BPIC17 Anonymous
Case OC-SVM [10] 0.49 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.55 0.24 0.26 0.35 0.10
Naive [5] 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.21 0.17 0.31 0.16
Sampling [5] 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.55 0.21 0.17 0.32 0.23
Likelihood [7]. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Naive+ 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.45 0.38 0.47 0.55 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.15
t-STIDE+ [15] 0.40 0.51 0.53 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.47 0.68 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.22
Likelihood+ 0.85 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.62 0.44 0.33 0.45 0.51
DAE [15] 0.46 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.63 0.70 0.60 0.21 0.00 0.30 0.35
BINetv1 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.62 0.41 0.37 0.51 0.51
BINetv2 [1] 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.73 0.61 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.45
BINetv3 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.74 0.66 0.45 0.36 0.49 0.50
Attribute OC-SVM [10] 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.30
Naive [5] 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.39
Sampling [5] 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.39
Likelihood [7] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Naive+ 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.33
t-STIDE+ [15] 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.28 0.40 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.39
Likelihood+ 0.74 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.57 0.35 0.29 0.07 0.28 0.63
DAE [15] 0.25 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.46 0.56 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.52
BINetv1 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.42 0.28 0.21 0.38 0.60
BINetv2 [1] 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.34 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.55
BINetv3 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.48 0.29 0.19 0.35 0.63
Table 2: F1 score over all datasets by detection level and method; best results (before round-
ing) are shown in bold typeface
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Figure 11: Critical difference diagram for all methods on all synthetic datasets; groups of
methods that are not significantly different (at p = 0.05) are connected (cf. [32])
the best performance.
All results are given using the heuristics described above. Labels were not
used in the process. Additional material (e.g., evaluation per perspective, per
dataset, runtime) can be found in the respective code repository.
To validate the significance of the results, we apply the non-parametric Fried-
man test [30] on average ranks of all methods based on F1 score for all synthetic
datasets. Then, we apply the Nemenyi post-hoc test [31] as demonstrated in [32],
to calculate pairwise significance. Figure 11 shows a critical difference (CD) di-
agram as proposed in [32] to visualize the results with a confidence interval of 95
percent. Based on the critical difference, we recognize that BINetv1 performs
significantly better than all other methods, except BINetv2 and BINetv3. That
is, all three BINet versions lie in the same significance group with respect to
the critical difference. DAE lies in the same group as BINetv2 and BINetv3,
and Likelihood+ in the same as DAE and BINetv3. All other methods lie more
than the critical difference away from the three BINets.
18
6. Classifying Anomalies
Until now, we have not utilized the predictive capabilities that BINet possesses.
Using the probability distribution output of the softmax layers in conjunction
with the binarized anomaly scores, we can define simple rules to infer the type
(or class) of an anomaly.
We use the term predictions to denote all possible attribute values that lie
within the confidence interval determined by the threshold. Note that now the
Shift class becomes relevant because it indicates the place where an early or late
execution would belong. For each anomalous attribute (according to BINet),
we apply the following rules in order.
1. Skip: If all predictions do not appear somewhere in the case
2. Insert : If one of the predictions appears somewhere in the case and that
occurrence has not been flagged as anomalous
3. Rework : If the same activity is present somewhere earlier in the case and
is not flagged as anomalous
4. Shift : If one of the prediction appears either somewhere earlier or later in
the case and is flagged as anomalous
5. Late: If the activity appears somewhere earlier in the predictions and is
flagged as anomalous
6. Early : If the activity appears somewhere later in the predictions and is
flagged as anomalous
7. Attribute: Trivially, all anomalous attributes in the data perspective are
of type Attribute
The result of the classification is visualized in Fig. 12. Interestingly, this set
of simple rules performs remarkably well. Anomaly classes inferred by the rules
are indicated by the color of the cells, whereas ground truth labels are shown
as text in the cells (we omit Normal for clarity). Incidentally, this visualization
also depicts the binarized anomaly scores according to the threshold since each
classified attribute is also an anomalous attribute.
We also included some examples where the classification is incorrect. An
interesting case is the second Skip example because Evaluate has also been
marked as anomalous ¬. As we have defined in Fig. 2, Evaluate is an activity
that always eventually follows Develop Method. However, Develop Method was
skipped. Therefore, BINet is never presented with the causing activity, and
hence regards Evaluate as anomalous.
A different example is that BINet misses the third Rework activity in the
second example ­. We observed many of these errors, and they are related
to the fact that BINet is conditioned on the last input activity and forgets
the history of the case (forgetting problem). Under these conditions, Develop
Method indeed directly follows Research Related Work, and hence BINet misses
it. This forgetting problem is something we want to address in the future.
The most interesting case is the second Early example ®. Here, BINet
misclassifies the Early activity as Shift. Upon closer inspection, we realize that
this is indeed a way of explaining the anomaly, albeit not the one the labels
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Figure 12: Classification of anomalies on the Paper dataset based on anomaly scores from
BINetv1 using h = lp
(a)
→ ; colors indicate the prediction of the classifier (see legend) and actual
classes are shown as text within the cells
indicate. With respect to Develop Method, Conclude indeed occurs too early in
the case. Nevertheless, BINet fails to detect the actual Shift point ¯, and hence
the rules do not match the pattern correctly.
Using this simple set of rules we ran the classifier on all synthetic datasets,
using BINetv1 as the anomaly detection method and h = lp(a)→ (the best heuristic
for BINetv1). Figure 13 shows the results in a confusion matrix. Note that the
classifier uses as input the anomaly detection result of BINet, and hence can
never distinguish normal from anomalous examples. Thus, the errors for the
normal class are based on the errors BINet commits in the anomaly detection
task. Disregarding these errors, this results in a macro average F1 score of 0.83
over all datasets for the classification task. Since BINetv1 reaches an average F1
score of 0.64 on the detection task, this result is truly impressive, considering the
simplicity of the rules. For the joint task (detection and classification), BINetv1
reaches an average F1 score of 0.70.
In Fig. 13, we notice that BINet errs especially often for Rework, Early,
Late, and Shift. This is connected to the forgetting problem mentioned earlier.
Remember that Rework, Early, and Late anomalies are affecting sequences of
events, that is, up to 3 events can be part of a rework anomaly, and up to 2 events
can be executed early or late. In the case of Rework, we have already seen an
example in Fig. 12, where BINet misclassifies because of forgetting. Figure 13
confirms that this error occurs quite often since more than 50 percent of all
Rework anomalies are misclassified as Normal. All of these misclassifications
happen in cases where a sequence of more than one event has been executed
again.
Note that not every repetition of an event is classified as a Rework, only the
events identified to be anomalous are. Hence, a repeated event (a loop in the
process) is classified as Normal, if BINet has learned that it can occur multiple
times in a case. In the Paper process, this is demonstrated by the second Submit
event, which can naturally occur multiple times in a case. In Fig. 13 we can
see that BINet very rarely classifies a Normal activity as Rework (never in the
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Figure 13: Confusion matrix for all runs of BINetv1 on synthetic datasets with h = lp
(a)
→ ;
color indicates distribution of actual class
Paper datasets); thus, we can conclude that BINet has learned to model the
loop in the Paper process correctly.
As with Rework, we can explain the errors for Early and Late by the same
argument. However, these two classes are also often misclassified as Insert or
Shift. The latter goes back to the second Early example of Fig. 12 and the
ambiguity of labels. The Insert errors are of a different kind. They occur
because the rule set is not taking into account that multiple events can be
executed early or late. We expect to find an early execution somewhere later in
the case as the prediction; however, this can only be true for the first event of
an early sequence. The same argument can be made for late executions.
The Shift errors are related to the fact that the random process models often
allow skipping of events. When a Shift anomaly is applied to an optional event,
BINet, or any other method, has no means of finding the anomaly. This could
be accounted for by altering the generation algorithm.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that a simple set of rules can be used to
classify the anomalies types we have introduced before. Note that this is a
white-box approach and a human user can easily interpret the resulting classifi-
cation. Even though the different classes are only a subset of all anomaly types,
they do cover many of the anomalies encountered in real-life business processes.
Importantly, it is quite easy to define new rules for new types of anomalies based
on the predictive capabilities of BINet.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented three versions of BINet, a neural network archi-
tecture for multi-perspective anomaly classification in business process event
logs. Additionally, we proposed a set of heuristics for setting the threshold
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of an anomaly detection algorithm automatically, based on the anomaly ratio
function. Finally, we demonstrated that a simple set of rules could be used for
classification of anomaly types, solely based on the output of BINet.
BINet is a recurrent neural network, and can, therefore, be used for real-
time anomaly detection, since it does not require a completed case for detection.
BINet does not rely on any information about the process modeled by an event
log, nor does it depend on a clean dataset. Utilizing the lowest plateau heuristic,
BINet’s internal threshold can be set automatically, reducing manual workload
and allowing fully autonomous operation.
It can be used to find point anomalies as well as contextual anomalies because
it models the sequential nature of the cases utilizing both the control flow and
the data perspective. Furthermore, BINet can cope with concept drift, for it
can be set up to train on new cases in real-time continuously.
Based on the empirical evidence obtained in the evaluation, BINet is a
promising method for anomaly detection, especially in business process event
logs. BINet outperformed the opposition on all detection levels. Specifically, on
the synthetic datasets, BINet’s performance surpasses those of other methods
by an order of magnitude. We demonstrated that BINet also performs well on
the real-life datasets because BINet shows high recall of the artificial anomalies
introduced to the original real-life logs.
Even though the results look very promising, there is still room for improve-
ment. For example, BINet suffers from forgetting when sequences of events are
repeated in a case. This issue can be addressed in future work, for example, by
using a special attention layer. An interesting option is the use of a bidirectional
encoder-decoder structure to read in cases both from left to right and from right
to left. Hereby, sequences of repeated events can be identified from two sides,
as opposed to just one.
Overall, the results presented in this paper suggest that BINet is a reli-
able and versatile method for detecting—and classifying—anomalies in business
process logs.
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